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Abstract
The relationship between wealth and power has long been debated.
Nevertheless, this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic
game. In this paper, we study wealth e¤ects in a strategic contest
game. Two opposing e¤ects arise: wealth reduces the marginal cost
of e¤ort but it also reduces the marginal benet of winning the con-
test. We consider three types of contests which vary depending on
whether rents and e¤orts are commensurable with wealth. Our theo-
retical analysis shows that the e¤ects of wealth are strongly contest-
dependent. It thus does not support general claims that the rich
lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur
conicts.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The general motivation
As popularized by Frank and Cooks (1995) best-selling book The Winner-
Take-All Societymany competitive situations take the form of a contest.
Examples include political lobbying, research and development, marketing,
promotion, status-seeking, and litigation activities (Konrad 2009). In this
paper, we are interested in the e¤ect of wealth in contests. In particular,
the motivation for our analysis includes general questions such as: Do rich
people lobby more? Does poverty lead to more conicts? Does low economic
growth and wealth inequality increase political activism?
The relationship between wealth and power has attracted attention for
centuries (Marx 1867, Wright Mills 1956). The conventional wisdom suggests
that the rich are more powerful than the poor.1 Bartels (2005) and Gilens
(2005) observe, for instance, that US senators are more responsive to the
opinions of their more a­ uent constituents. This idea has been extensively
discussed in political science, often pejoratively referred as plutocracy. It is
exemplied by Hacker and Piersons (2011) recent book Winner-Take-All
Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richerand Turned Its Back on
the Middle Class.
Nevertheless, in contrast, casual observation suggests that low wealth
induces greater participation and e¤ort in contest-type situations. People
involved in highly predatory and competitive activities, such as thieves or
athletes for instance, typically come from poorer segments of society. More
1This is consistent with the beliefs of some prominent economists. For instance, Anne
Krueger (1974), in her pioneering work on rent seeking argues that we can perceive the price
system as a mechanism rewarding the rich and well-connected. Likewise Jack Hirshleifer
(1995) stresses that the half of the population above the median wealth surely has greater
political strength than the half below. Paul Krugman (2010) similarly observes that the
rich are di¤erent from you and me: they have more inuence. Lastly, Daron Acemoglu
(2013) declares that the rise in inequality has created a class of very wealthy citizens who
can use their wealth to gain more political power  partly to defend their wealth and
partly to further their economic, political, and ideological agendas.
2
corruption is also typically observed in poorer countries (Aidt 2009, Gundlach
and Paldam 2009). Some groups (e.g., farmers), although often relatively
poor, are well-known to be politically powerful. Poverty has also been found
to be a robust factor in explaining violent crime and civil conicts (Collier
and Hoe­ er 1998, Fajnzylberg, Lederman and Loayza 2002, Fearon and
Laitin 2003, Blattman and Miguel 2010). Relatedly, it is often said that
redistribution policies favour political stability and social peace. Finally, a
recent experimental study shows that wealth has non-monotonic e¤ects on
conict intensity (Baik, Chowdhury and Ramalingam 2015).
1.2 The model, and the basic e¤ects
Although the above observations concern disparate issues, they suggest that
wealth may have fundamentally di¤erent, and perhaps opposing, e¤ects in
contests. This further suggests that economic theory may help us pin down
and examine the strength of these e¤ects. Yet, wealth e¤ects have received
little attention in the (otherwise vast) theoretical literature on contests (Tul-
lock 1980, Garnkel and Skaperdas 2007, Konrad 2009, Congleton, Hillman
and Konrad 2010). Indeed, the workhorsemodel in this literature, often
coined the Tullock contest model, is based on a strategic game in which
wealth plays essentially no role. In this game, each agent has the following
payo¤ function:
Ui = wi   xi +ir; (1)
in which xi is agent is e¤ort, r > 0 is the rent (i.e., the prize) for the contest
winner and i is the probability of winning the contest. Notice immediately
then that individual wealth wi enters separately in the payo¤ function (1),
and thus has no e¤ect on the agents e¤ort (hence, wealth is, without loss of
generality, normalized to zero in the literature).
In this paper, we adapt this basic contest model in order to examine the
e¤ects of wealth. Namely, we introduce in model (1) a utility function u()
that displays the familiar property of decreasing marginal utility of wealth,
i.e. u00 < 0. Note immediately that this introduction requires to specify
whether the rent r and e¤orts xi can be expressed in monetary terms, and
thus are commensurable with wealth wi within the utility function. This
specication is central. Indeed, it technically removes the separability of
wealth with the rent and e¤orts in model (1). Moreover, it permits to pin
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down two basic e¤ects that we believe should naturally arise in contests:
 First, wealth can reduce the marginal cost of e¤ort. To illustrate, note
that it is marginally less costly for a rich person than a poor person
to o¤er a monetary payment to, e.g., a politician, in order to obtain
some privilege. The rich can thus relatively more easily a¤ord costly
expenditures in a contest than the poor, other things being equal.
 Second, and in contrast to the rst e¤ect, wealth may decrease the
marginal benet of winning a contest. To illustrate, note that it is
marginally more benecial for the poor to obtain the monetary reward
associated with victory in a contest. We may thus regard the poor as
being relatively more motivated to exert e¤ort in a contest than the
rich, other things being equal.
Although these e¤ects are simple, their analysis is not trivial because of
strategic considerations. If a change in wealth a¤ects the level of e¤ort of
one player, the other player is expected to react to this change, which in
turn a¤ects the initial player and so on. There is thus a need to carefully
examine the overall impact of wealth on the playersequilibrium e¤orts using
the standard tools of game theory.
1.3 The contest success function
In strategic contest games, the probability i is usually coined the contest
success function (CSF). This function denes the contest technologyand it
strongly a¤ects the properties of the game. In our two-player game (i = a; b),
we will often denote the probability of a winning as p(xa; xb) such that b =
1 p(xa; xb). We will assume throughout that the CSF has the power-logistic
form (Tullock 1980):2 i.e.,
a = p(xa; xb) =
xma
xma + x
m
b
; (2)
2This CSF is a special case of logistic functions, p(xa; xb) =
(xa)
(xa)+(xb)
. Garnkel
and Skaperdas (2007) and Konrad (2009) discuss the axiomatic foundations and economic
illustrations for this special, but common, class of CSFs. Moreover, Jia (2008) shows that
this CSF can also be motivated as the probability of winning a rank-order tournament (as
in Lazear and Rosen, 1981), when the noise terms are drawn from the inverse exponential
distribution (see also Jia et al., 2013). Under these conditions, the contests that we
consider may therefore also be considered as rank-order tournaments.
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with xi > 0 (i = a; b) and m > 0. If a exerts twice as much e¤ort as b, the
odds that he wins over b is 2m : 1. The parameter m is thus the contest
decisiveness parameter measuring how important relative e¤ort ( xi
xj
) is com-
pared to random factors for winning the contest (Hirshleifer 1991). If m! 0,
each player wins the contest with probability 1
2
independently of the levels of
e¤ort. The larger m, the more pronounced the e¤ects of relative di¤erences
in e¤ort on the likelihood of winning.
While this CSF is increasing and homogeneous of degree zero in its argu-
ments, concavity is only guaranteed for arbitrary e¤ort levels when m  1.
Because of the salient use of the workhorsemodel (1) in the literature, the
assumption m  1 is prevalent (an exception is Perez-Castrillo and Verdier
1992). From an empirical stance, this assumption seem unduly restrictive.3
There are typically two ways to relax this assumption. The rst is by re-
stricting oneself to symmetric contests. As shown by Baye, Kovenock and De
Vries (1994) in a symmetric Tullock contest, a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies exists as long as m  2.4 Since we are interested in the e¤ects
of changes in wealth and in wealth inequality, the symmetry assumption is
not appropriate. A second way out is to have su¢ ciently increasing marginal
disutility of e¤ort. Indeed, in our contest models, playerspreferences are
nonlinear in e¤orts. Hence we need not restrict m to be in the unit interval,
and all our numerical examples consider m > 1:
The properties of p() are given in Appendix A.2. Here, we draw attention
to the following property
p12 =
@2p
@xa@xb
=
m2
xaxb
ab(a   b); (3)
meaning that the marginal productivity of one players e¤ort is enhanced by
the other players e¤ort i¤ the former exerts more e¤ort. Thus, the strategic
models we will consider are neither games of strategic complements nor of
3To illustrate, Hwang (2009) provides an idea about the order of magnitude of m in
some contests. Using data from battles fought in 17th century Europe and during World
War II, he obtains values of .704 (.120) and 3.420 (.678), respectively (standard errors in
brackets).
4For larger m, the rst- and second-order conditions fail to characterise the best-
response functions, the reason being that a single player can protably deviate from the
(symmetric) solution to these conditions by exerting zero e¤ort.
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strategic substitutes. In fact, as in Nti (1999) and Acemoglu and Jensen
(2013) for instance, some interesting features arise in our contest models
because the change in the e¤ort of one player will either increase the e¤ort
of the other player (when this player wants to keep up) or decrease this
e¤ort (because this other player gives up).
1.4 The related literature
A few studies have discussed the e¤ect of wealth in strategic models of con-
tests. These e¤ects di¤er signicantly from those considered in this paper.
We rst discuss Hirshleifers (1991) so-called paradox of power. In its weak
form, this paradox states that the nal distribution of wealth will have less
dispersion than the initial distribution of wealth. In its strong form, it states
that there should be equal nal distribution of wealth. Hirshleifer (1991)
presents numerical examples in a contest model for which the paradox of
power does, or does not, hold. In his model, initial wealth is divided between
productive e¤ort and ghting e¤ort. The key di¤erence to our model is thus
that the rent, i.e., aggregate production, is endogenous.
A related model is the winner take all with limited liability model
introduced in Skaperdas and Gan (1995). The agents payo¤ in this model
essentially writes as follows
Ui = iu(wi   xi):
An interpretation of this model is that the loser diesand obtains utility
u(0) = 0. Although Skaperdas and Gan (1995) does not study the e¤ect of
wealth (but that of risk aversion), it is easy to understand that wealth has
a positive e¤ect in this model. The intuition is that the two e¤ects we have
identied above go in the same direction. Wealth decreases the marginal cost
of e¤ort (as described above), but wealth also increases the marginal benet
of e¤ort. Indeed, this last e¤ect simply means that life is more valuable when
wealthier.
Che and Gale (1997) examine the e¤ect of budget constraints in a basic
contest model as in (1). They show that each agents equilibrium e¤ort is
a weakly increasing function of the agents budget constraint, and that the
presence of budget constraints lowers aggregate e¤ort. Therefore, if one nat-
urally assumes that a wealthier agent is less budget-constrained, wealth has a
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positive e¤ect on e¤ort. The e¤ect of a budget constraint can be interpreted
as an extreme utility curvature of the utility function u() at zero. However,
since the utility function is otherwise linear, there are no wealth e¤ects when
wealth changes occur within the bounds of unconstrained e¤orts. Moreover,
the model does not capture the e¤ect that wealthier agents may have a lower
marginal benet of obtaining rent.
Finally, we briey discuss Grossmans (1991) model of insurrection. This
model sensitively di¤ers from model (1), but has been quite inuential in the
conict literature (Azam 2006, Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel 2009, Besley
and Persson 2012). Grossman (1991) considers a general equilibriummodel in
which agents choose how to devote their time between production, soldiering
(for the government) and insurrection. This implies that income (generated
by production) and conict expenditures are endogenously determined in
equilibrium. The more decisive is the CSF, the larger is the fraction of time
devoted to insurrection as opposed to production. As a result, there is an
equilibrium associating low wealth and high conict expenditures. A key
insight from this model is that participation in soldiering increases with the
opportunity cost of ghting.
1.5 The organization of the paper
As we said above, two wealth e¤ects typically arise in contests: i) wealth
decreases the marginal cost of e¤ort, but also ii) decreases the marginal ben-
et of winning the contest. We study in turn three strategic contest models
depending on whether the rst, second, or both wealth e¤ects play a role. In
each of these models, we compare the levels of e¤orts of a poor and a rich
within an equilibrium. We also compare these levels across equilibria that
di¤er only by a change in the wealth of one or both players. We characterize
wealth e¤ects both on individual e¤orts and on aggregate e¤orts, and also
study the e¤ect of a wealth transfer among the two players.
Since we use the comparative statics method, it is important to stress
that we will focus on the part of the parameter space for which a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. The parameter space is made up of
the two wealth levels, the CSF decisiveness parameter, the size of the prize
and the curvature parameters of the playersutility and cost functions. The
main text presents and discusses the di¤erent models and wealth e¤ects, and
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only provides a sketch of the results together with some graphical illustra-
tions. All the results are demonstrated in the Appendix.
We consider in Section 2 the so-called privilege contestmodel. In this
model, e¤ort is monetary, but the rent  i.e., the privilege is non-monetary
and therefore its marginal value is independent of the level of wealth. There-
fore, only the rst e¤ect on marginal cost described above is active. We then
consider in Section 3 a model in which only the second e¤ect described above
on the marginal benet is active, the so-called ability contestmodel. In this
alternative model, rent is monetary but e¤ort  which determines ability
is non-monetary and so the marginal cost of e¤ort is independent of wealth.
We show that the e¤ect of increasing wealth on agent e¤ort is positive in the
privilege contest model while it is negative in the ability contest model. We
also examine the e¤ect of wealth redistribution in both models, and nd that
this e¤ect tends to decrease aggregate e¤ort for a low decisiveness parameter.
In Section 4, we study a model in which both the rent and the e¤orts
are monetary, the so-called rent-seeking contestmodel, corresponding to
the rent-seeking model with risk aversion (Cornes and Hartley 2012). In this
model, we show that under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the two
opposing wealth e¤ects exactly o¤set each other so that wealth has no e¤ect
on the e¤orts of agents. Moreover, we show that wealth tends to increase
e¤ort under a specic condition on the utility. This condition appeared in
the single-agent risk theory literature (Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger
1996), and is such that more background risk increases risk aversion. We
demonstrate that under this condition, a rich agent exerts relatively more ef-
fort than a poor agent, and that an isolated increase in the wealth of the rich
agent always increases that agents e¤ort, but reduces the e¤ort of the poor
agent. Finally, Section 5 summarizes all the wealth e¤ects in the privilege,
ability and rent-seeking contest models, and concludes our analysis.
The appendix provides the technicalities supporting the analysis pre-
sented in the main text. In Appendix A.1, using a single-crossing prop-
erty, we provide a general comparative statics method to study the e¤ects
of wealth in a two-player game. In Appendix A.2, we display the proper-
ties of the CSF. In Appendix A.3, we characterize some conditions ensuring
existence, uniqueness and stability. In Appendices A.4, A.5 and A.6, we re-
spectively demonstrate the results for the privilege, ability and rent-seeking
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contest models. In Appendix A.7, we provide demonstrations of the results
regarding the e¤ects of wealth transfers in each contest model. These last
results are the most complex to derive, and we often restrict the analysis to
CARA, quadratic or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions.
2 The privilege contest model
In the privilege contest model, the rent is non-monetary. Our chief interpre-
tation is that the benet from winning the contest is only associated with a
form of prestige (or ego-utility), without any nancial counterpart. This
model of contest may include, for instance, status-seeking activities, political
campaign contributions or warfare for purely ideological motives.
Denoting the non-monetary benet of the privilege as r, we model the
preferences of player i (= a; b) with wealth wi and exerting e¤ort xi as
Ui = u(wi   xi) + ir: (4)
Observe that in this model wealth wi and e¤ort xi are commensurable within
the utility function u(). In the rest of the paper, we will assume that u()
is thrice continuously di¤erentiable with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. The marginal
utility of e¤ort,
@Ui
@xi
=  u0(wi   xi) + @i
@xi
r;
reveals that the marginal benet of e¤ort will depend on xj (j 6= i) in a way
consistent with (3), while the marginal cost of e¤ort (the rst rhs term) does
not.
We start our analysis with the simpler symmetric case, wa = wb = w.
Using (2), the equilibrium condition for the symmetric equilibrium x is given
by
HP (w)
def
=  u0(w   x) + m
4x
r = 0:
This condition captures the tension between the marginal cost and the mar-
ginal benet of e¤ort. Observe that wealth only a¤ects the term  u0(w x),
and that this e¤ect is positive. Indeed, the e¤ect of wealth is given by the
sign of H 0P (w) =  u00(w   x) > 0. This represents the rst e¤ect mentioned
above that wealth reduces the marginal cost of e¤ort. Thus in the privilege
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model, e¤ort is a normal good.
The non-symmetric equilibrium case is more complex, but the intuition
is easy to grasp by looking at rst rounde¤ects. Let wa > wb. E¤ort being
a normal good, an increase in the wealth of the poorer agent, wb, will trigger
an increase in xb. Since xa exceeds xb in this case, the increase in xb will
raise the marginal benet of the rich agents e¤ort as given by (3), thereby
triggering an increase in that e¤ort, and thus also in total e¤ort. On the other
hand, when the rich agent a gets wealthier, he will adjust his e¤ort up, which
in view of (3) will lower the marginal benet of his poorer opponent, who
reacts by adjusting her e¤ort downwards. The last mechanism is particularly
strong if the e¤ort levels, and thus the wealth levels, are far apart, so that it
may lead to a reduction in total e¤ort. A proper comparative statics analysis
complements these rst round e¤ects with feedback e¤ects, and is presented
fully in the Appendix A.4. Here in Figure 1, we further illustrate this analysis
by drawing best-response functions for players a and b, denoted f(xb; wa) and
g(xa; wb) respectively.
Figure 1. Equilibria in the privilege contest model for di¤erent wealth
combinations.
In this Figure, we assume that u(w) = w
1 
1  (i.e., CRRA) with  = 2,
m = 2, r = 1. The best-response functions of players a and b are drawn for
wa = 10; 17 and 20, and for wb = 10; 14, and 20. First observe that for large
e¤orts of the opponent, the best-response for each player is zero e¤ort, hence
10
the discontinuity in the best-response functions (visible in the gure for wa
and wb equal to 10). Note that these functions are rst increasing and then de-
creasing, with a maximum at xa = xb. Note also that an increase in wa moves
the best-response function f(xb; wa) rightward and an increase in wb moves
the best-response function g(xb; wb) upward. Simple wealth e¤ects naturally
follow. Point A represents a symmetric equilibrium with uniform low wealth
(wa = wb = 10), while point D represents a symmetric equilibrium with
uniform high wealth (wa = wb = 20). A move from A to D thus illustrates
that e¤orts increase with a common increase in wealth, as shown theoreti-
cally above. Observe also a within-equilibrium result: wealthier agents exert
more e¤orts. Indeed, point B represents for instance an equilibrium with
wa = 17 > wb = 10 leading to xa > xb. The move from B to C illustrates the
e¤ect of an increase in wb from 10 to 14 leading to increase in both xa and xb.
Point E is the result of an increase in wa from 17 to 20 leading to an increase
in xa but a decrease in xb: Thus, total e¤ort grows with an increase in wb
but not necessarily with an increase in wa (see the Appendix A.4 for a suf-
cient condition to sign this e¤ect). We summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 1 In the privilege contest model, the rich player exerts more
e¤ort than the poor player. Moreover, a common increase in wealth in-
creases total e¤ort. An isolated increase in the poor players wealth always
increases the equilibrium e¤orts of both players. An isolated increase in the
rich players wealth has a positive e¤ect on his own e¤ort but a negative e¤ect
on the e¤ort of the poor player.
We nally discuss the e¤ects of wealth inequality. We observe that de-
creasing inequality in the sense of making the poor richer, or increasing in-
equality in the sense of making the rich richer, both may increase total e¤ort.
Therefore, there is no systematic relationship between wealth inequality and
e¤ort in the privilege contest model. We therefore study the e¤ect of more
wealth inequality when total wealth is constant. More precisely, we study
the e¤ect of a mean-preserving spread (MPS) in wealth. In the Appendix,
we show that when m is small enoughthen a small MPS increases total
e¤ort. Under CARA this holds when m < 2 
1
2 ' :707. When u is quadratic,
the condition is m < 1. When u has CRRA , this holds i¤ (1
2
 m2) > 1
2
.
In the numerical example of Figure 2, which has  = m = 2, aggregate e¤ort
in point D (wa = wb = 20) is 29:19. Redistributing one unit of wealth results
in a lower aggregate e¤ort (29:14).
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3 The ability contest model
In the ability contest model, e¤ort is non-monetary. Our principal interpre-
tation is a situation in which agents exert physical or mental e¤orts that
increase their abilities, and thus put them in a better position to win a con-
test. Competitive sports, but also education lters, are examples of such
contests. In this model, player is expected utility equals
Ui = iu(wi + r) + (1  i)u(wi)  c(xi);
with c0 > 0 and c00  0. As before, we assume that u() is concave, which rep-
resents decreasing marginal utility of wealth (or risk aversion). The marginal
utility of e¤ort is
@Ui
@xi
=
@i
@xi
[u(wi + r)  u(wi)]  c0(xi):
The key property in this contest model is that the marginal cost of exerting
e¤ort is independent of wealth. As argued earlier, if this marginal cost is
strictly increasing we can relax the assumption that m  1 for a Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies to exist. As in the privilege contest, the marginal
cost of e¤ort does not depend on the e¤ort of the opponent, while the mar-
ginal benet does in the way described by (3).
Again, we consider rst the simpler symmetric case, wa = wb = w. Using
(2), the equilibrium condition for the symmetric equilibrium x is now given
by
HA(w)
def
=
m
4x
[u(w + r)  u(w)]  c0(x) = 0:
Observe that wealth only a¤ects the term m
4x
[u(w + r)   u(w)], and that
H 0A(w) is negative under u
00 < 0. This e¤ect represents the second e¤ect
mentioned in the Introduction that wealth reduces the marginal benet of
winning the contest. The rich is relatively less motivated to win the contest
than the poor, and e¤ort is an inferior good in this model.
In the ability contest model, the direction of the e¤ects is thus reversed
compared to the privilege contest model. If the rich agent gets wealthier, he
will reduce his e¤ort, which will lower the marginal benet of the e¤ort of the
poorer opponent. So the latter reduces her e¤ort as well and total e¤ort falls.
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On the other hand, if the poorer agent gets wealthier, she reduces her e¤ort,
which increases the marginal benet of the richer agent who responds by
adjusting his e¤ort upwards. The e¤ect on total e¤ort may then be positive,
especially when the wealth gap, and therefore the di¤erence in e¤ort that
governs (3), is large (see the Appendix A.5 for a su¢ cient condition to sign
this e¤ect).
Figure 2. Equilibria in the ability contest model for di¤erent wealth
combinations.
Figure 2 further illustrates these results. For this example u(w) = log(w)
(i.e., CRRA  = 1), c(x) = x2, m = 2, and r = 4. The best-response
functions of players a and b are drawn for wa = 6; 12 and 16, and for wb = 6; 8,
and 16. An increase in wealth decreases the best-response functions in the
ability contest model. Thus, point A represents a symmetric equilibrium with
low wealth (wa = wb = 6), and the move from A to D illustrates the e¤ect of
a common increase in wealth from 6 to 16. Similarly, point B represents an
equilibrium with wa = 12 > wb = 6, and the move from B to E illustrates the
e¤ect of an increase in wa, resulting in a downward adjustment in both e¤ort
levels. The move from B to C on the other hand, represents an increase in
wb from 6 to 8, resulting in opposing adjustments in the e¤ort levels of the
two players. This leads to the following results.
Proposition 2 In the ability contest model, the rich player exerts less e¤ort
than the poor player. A common increase in wealth decreases total e¤ort. An
isolated increase in the rich players wealth always reduces the equilibrium
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e¤ort of both players. An isolated increase in the poor players wealth reduces
her own e¤ort but increases the e¤ort of the rich player.
We now discuss the e¤ects of wealth inequality. As in the privilege con-
test, we rst observe that there is no systematic relationship between wealth
inequality and e¤ort in the ability contest model. Indeed, decreasing inequal-
ity in the sense of making the poor richer, or increasing inequality in the sense
of making the rich richer, both may decrease total e¤ort. We then examine
the e¤ect of a small MPS in wealth. In the Appendix, we show that when the
contest decisiveness parameter m is su¢ ciently small compared to the dif-
ference in curvature of u() and c(), then aggregate e¤ort will rise following
the introduction of a small wealth inequality. In the numerical example of
Figure 2, when wa = wb = 6, aggregate e¤ort is :7147 and a one unit wealth
transfer from a to b lowers aggregate e¤ort (:7133).
4 The rent-seeking contest model
In the rent-seeking contest model, both rent and e¤ort are monetary. This
model can accommodate many contest-type situations including lobbying,
marketing, and litigation activities where both the rent and the e¤ort have
a direct monetary counterpart.5 In this model, player is expected utility
equals
Ui = iu(wi + r   xi) + (1  i)u(wi   xi): (5)
The concavity of u() is usually interpreted as risk aversion (Cornes and Hart-
ley 2012), and we retain this interpretation in what follows. The marginal
utility of e¤ort is now
@Ui
@xi
=
@i
@xi
[u(wi+r xi) u(wi xi)] [iu0(wi + r   xi) + (1  i)u0(wi   xi)] :
Unlike in the privilege or ability contest model, the marginal cost of a players
e¤ort, which corresponds to the expected marginal utility (the second square
bracket term), increases when the opponent raises his or her e¤ort.
5The economics literature on contests has traditionally (and often implicitly) assumed
that both the rent and the e¤ort are monetary. For instance, an important focus in this
literature has concerned the rate of rent dissipation, i.e., ixir , which assumes that the
rent and the e¤orts are expressed in the sametypically monetaryunit.
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Let wa = wb = w. Using (2), the equilibrium condition for the symmetric
equilibrium x is now given by
HRS(w)
def
=
m
4x
[u(w + r   x)  u(w   x)]  1
2
[u0(w + r   x) + u0(w   x) = 0:
Observe that wealth a¤ects both terms of the equilibrium condition. We
have
H 0RS(w) =
m
4x
[u0(w + r   x)  u0(w   x)]  1
2
[u00(w + r   x) + u00(w   x)];
so that the rst term of the rhs is negative while the second term is posi-
tive. This illustrates the two opposite e¤ects of wealth on rent seeking e¤orts.
Let us now dene two lotteries: a uniformly distributed lottery ez =dU(w 
x;w   x + r) and a binary lottery ey =d (w   x + r; 12 ;w   x; 12). Then it is
easy to check that H 0RS(w) > 0 is equivalent to
 Eu00(ez)
Eu0(ez) <  Eu00(ey)Eu0(ey) :
In other words, a common increase in wealth in the rent-seeking contest model
increases e¤orts depending on how absolute risk aversion is a¤ected by a
change in background risk from lottery ez to lottery ey. It is then immediately
obtained that when u displays CARA then H 0RS(w) = 0. It is also easily
observed that H 0RS(w) = 0 under a quadratic utility.
6 Given that the binary
lottery (ey) is a MPS of the uniform lottery (ez), the sign of H 0RS(w) is positive
(resp. negative) if the MPS of a background risk increases (resp. decreases)
the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Let us now introduce the following
denition.
Denition 1 Let 
 be the class of utility functions so that a MPS of a
background risk increases absolute risk aversion.
It sounds intuitive that additional background risk induces greater risk
aversion, i.e., u 2 
. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996, Prop. 3)
show, however, that the conditions on u() so that extra background risk
6Observe that Eez = Eey = w  x+ 12r. If u(w) = w  2w2, then  Eu00(ey)Eu0(ey) =  Eu00(ez)Eu0(ez) =

1 (w x+ 12 r)
.
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makes an agent more risk averse are complex, involving restrictions on higher-
order attitudes towards risk, such as the degree of temperance, i.e.,  u0000=u000.
A necessary condition for u 2 
 is that risk aversion increases when a zero-
mean background risk is introduced. Gollier and Pratt (1996) called this
condition risk vulnerabilityand it is a stronger condition than the famil-
iar DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion). The intuition for this result
may be given as follows. Investing in a contest is like gambling, where one
spends money to increase the probability of winning the monetary prize. For
the same reason that gambling activities should be reduced under increased
risk aversion, e¤orts in a contest should also be reduced with increasing risk
aversion (Treich 2010). By a similar reasoning, an increase in wealth  which
reduces risk aversion under DARA should increase e¤ort in a contest. Thus
u 2 
 (implying DARA) ensures that e¤ort in the rent-seeking contest model
is a normal good.
The rst round e¤ects of a wealth increase can then be presented as
follows. If the rich agent gets wealthier, he will increase e¤ort which not
only lowers the return to the poor agents e¤ort (through (3)) but also raises
the marginal cost of that e¤ort. Hence the poor agent reduces her e¤ort.
If the poor agent gets wealthier, she increases her e¤ort which raises the
marginal return of the rich agents e¤ort but also raises the marginal cost of
that e¤ort. The rst e¤ect, however, will be of second order when the two
agents are about equally wealthy, in which case we expect to see a reduction
in the rich agents e¤ort. The opposite is true if there is a substantial wealth
inequality; in that case, total e¤ort will increase.
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Figure 3. Equilibria in the rent-seeking model for di¤erent wealth combinations.
Figure 3 illustrates the di¤erent wealth e¤ects occurring under u 2 
.
It is assumed that u(w) = log(w) (i.e., CRRA =1), m = 3
2
, r = 10. The
best-response functions of players a and b are drawn for wa = 10; 15 and 18,
and for wb = 10; 14 and 18. Observe that unlike in the privilege or ability
contest the best-response functions cross the 450-line with a strictly negative
and nite slope. Observe also that the best-response functions again display
a discontinuity but without upsetting the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies for our range of parameters. Point A is a symmetric equilib-
rium where wa = wb = 10. A common increase in wealth by 8 units moves
the equilibrium to D. Indeed, wealth increases the equilibrium e¤ort. Point
B is an asymmetric equilibrium with wa = 15 > wb = 10. The move from
B to E is then because of an increase in wa from 15 to 18: xa increases, but
xb falls. Conversely, the move from B to C is because of an increase in wb
from 10 to 14. While raising xb, this leads to a fall in xa, illustrating the
dominance of the increased marginal cost of as e¤ort. The same is true for
the move from E to D. The results are demonstrated in Appendix A.6 and
summarized below.
Proposition 3 Suppose that u 2 
. In a rent-seeking contest model, the
rich player exerts more e¤ort than the poor player. An isolated increase in
the wealth of the rich player increases that players e¤ort, but reduces the
poor players e¤ort. An isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player
increases that players e¤ort.
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We nally discuss the e¤ect of wealth inequality on aggregate e¤ort in
the rent-seeking contest model. For the reason discussed earlier, there is no
e¤ect of wealth distribution across players under CARA or quadratic utility.
In the Appendix, we prove under CRRA preferences and when the stake of
the contest, r
w
, is small, that a small MPS in wealth reduces aggregate e¤ort.
In the numerical example of Figure 3, which has CRRA  = 1, aggregate
e¤ort when wa = wb = 18 is 7:159. Redistributing one unit of wealth leads to
an aggregate e¤ort of 7:155. Thus even with a r
w
= :55, the prediction holds.
We also provide a numerical example suggesting that u000 < 0 (imprudence)
may be a necessary condition for a MPS in wealth to raise aggregate e¤ort.
5 Summary and conclusion
The archetype of a contest is warfare. There is an old Latin expression (often
attributed to Cicero), pecunia nervus belli, meaning that money is the
sinews of war. That is, wealth is expected to play a central role in warfare.
But is this theoretically true? We base our answer on a theoretical analysis of
strategic models of contests. These models capture economic situations with
elements of warfare. The simplest conclusion we can o¤er from our analysis
is that the relationship between contestantse¤orts and wealth is strongly
contest-dependent. Besides, for each contest the results often depend on
functional forms and parameter values. Hence, our analysis does not support
without qualications general claims that the rich lobby more, nor that low
economic growth and inequality increase conict.
The more precise answer is that wealth e¤ects critically depend on the
nature of the rent and of the type of e¤orts exerted in a contest. They de-
pend in particular on whether the rent and/or e¤orts are commensurable
with wealth within the utility function. We have especially stressed the
importance of the property of decreasing marginal utility of wealth. This
property plays a fundamental role in our analysis through two basic e¤ects.
First, wealth decreases the marginal cost of monetary e¤ort. Second, wealth
decreases the marginal benet of winning a monetary rent. The rst e¤ect
tends to increase e¤orts, as we have shown in the privilege contest model.
The second e¤ect tends to decrease e¤orts, as we have shown in the ability
contest model. Therefore, the disparate e¤ects of wealth in contests that we
colloquially discussed in the Introduction may well reect these two funda-
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mentally opposing forces that our models identify.
However, these basic e¤ects go in an opposite direction when both the
rent and e¤orts are monetary. Therefore the total e¤ect of wealth is complex
and potentially limited, as we have shown in our rent-seeking contest model.
In the special, but common, case of a CARA utility function, the two e¤ects
exactly o¤set each other with wealth having no impact on e¤ort. Moreover,
we have shown that wealth increases e¤ort in the rent-seeking contest model
under the assumption on the utility function that more background risk in-
creases risk aversion in a single decision making setting. This assumption
involves higher-order derivatives of the utility function, and is stronger than
DARA. All the theoretical results of the three strategic contest games are
derived in the Appendix and are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Wealth e¤ects in the privilege, ability, and rent-seeking
contest models under wa  wb.a
Contest models: Privilege Ability Rent-seeking
Rich vs poor xa xb +   +
Isolated increase in wa
@xa
@wa
+   +
@xb
@wa
     
@(xa+xb)
@wa
+ i¤ (A.13)   + i¤ (A.22)
Isolated increase in wb
@xa
@wb
+ + ?
@xb
@wb
+   +
@(xa+xb)
@wb
+   i¤ (A.18) + i¤ (A.23)
Common increase @xi
@wi
jwa=wbdwa=dwb +   +
@(xa+xb)
@wi
jwa=wbdwa=dwb +   +
SmallMPS in wealth @xi
@wi
jwa=wbdwa= dwb + i¤ (A.16) + i¤ (A.19) + i¤ (A.24)
aSymbols + and   indicate the sign of the e¤ects mathematically described in the second
column. Symbol ? indicates that this sign is indeterminate. In the rent-seeking contest
model, we assume u 2 
 (cf. Denition 1).
Table 1 also illustrates the subtle e¤ects of isolated changes in wealth
compared to other possible parametric changes. Nti (1999) for instance ex-
amines in an asymmetric contest the e¤ect of changes in the valuation of the
rent, and concludes that competition becomes keener when the gap between
the contestants is not too large(Nti 1999, p. 425). Based on this insight,
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one would expect that increasing the wealth of the rich should decrease aggre-
gate e¤orts, while increasing the wealth of the poor should increase aggregate
e¤orts. Table 1 illustrates a much more complex pattern. Indeed, the total
e¤ect of an isolated increase in wealth of either the poor or the rich may be
always positive, or always negative. Moreover this e¤ect critically depends
on the type of contest (and the curvature of the utility function of wealth).
The last observation relates to our analysis of the e¤ects of wealth in-
equality. These e¤ects are the most complex. To illustrate, take the privi-
lege contest model. In this model, an isolated increase in wealth may always
increase aggregate e¤ort. Therefore, a decrease in inequality (through an
increase in the wealth of the poor) or an increase in inequality (through an
increase in the wealth of the rich) both increase aggregate e¤ort. Observe
then that wealth redistribution, i.e., transferring money from the rich to the
poor, combines the rst e¤ect and the opposite of the second e¤ect (for a
xed total wealth). It thus essentially involves two opposing e¤ects, and it
becomes very di¢ cult to sign the e¤ect of such a MPS in wealth without
further restricting the functional forms. In fact, we have shown in our three
contest models that the e¤ect of a MPS in wealth depends on the property of
the CSF, as well as on the sign of the higher-order derivatives of the utility
functions. Interestingly, these results stand in sharp contrast with the neu-
trality resultconcerning the e¤ect of wealth redistribution in the celebrated
private provision of public goods model (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986).
A simple implication of our analysis is that the consequences of a wealth re-
distribution policy in terms of political stability and social peace are by no
means obvious in general.
To conclude, let us mention some natural extensions to our results. To
start with, one may wish to consider other CSFs, an arbitrary number of
players and other dimensions of heterogeneity (e.g., on the cost or value of
rent). We may also want to assume that the rent itself depends on wealth.
As an illustration of this assumption, observe that a successful lobby activity
of a large rm is likely to give more benets than that of a small rm.
Intuitively, this e¤ect increases the marginal benet of winning the rent, and
should thus in general reinforce the rst positive e¤ect of wealth on e¤orts.
Interestingly though, this e¤ect holds even with a linear utility function of
wealth, and is present in Hirshleifer (1991) and Nti (1999). One might also
want to explore welfare e¤ects. This could be interesting in that an increase
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in the wealth of one or more players need not have a positive e¤ect on overall
welfare despite increasing utility. This is because of the strategic e¤ects that
may serve to increase overall e¤ort. However, a general study of welfare
e¤ects in contest models must also explicitly discuss to which extent e¤orts
are socially (un)productive. Finally, it could also be interesting to explore
dynamic e¤ects: wealth a¤ects conict, which in turn a¤ects wealth, and so
on. Such a dynamic analysis would permit a better understanding of the
somewhat elusive relationship between power and money.
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A Appendix
A.1 General comparative statics method
In our analysis, we study the e¤ects of several types of wealth changes. We
present here a method and some results about the conditions that determine
the sign of these wealth e¤ects in a general class of strategic models. This
class includes the three contest models considered in the paper.7 Theorem
1 below provides a simple single crossing property that will turn out to be
instrumental throughout the paper, while Theorem 2 derives a condition for
signing the e¤ect of a MPS in wealth.
We consider a strategic game with two players, i = a; b, in which the only
source of heterogeneity is wealth wi. We assume without loss of generality
that a is more wealthy than b: wa  wb (with wa = wb corresponding to
the symmetric situation). Each player i chooses an e¤ort level xi from a
convex feasible set. Remember that the best-response functions are denoted
f(xb; wa) and g(xa; wb) and that (xa; xb) constitute a Nash equilibrium for
the game with initial wealth (wa; wb) when
xa = f(g(xa; wb); wa); (A.1)
xb = g(f(xb; wa); wb): (A.2)
We write xa(wa; wb) and xb(wa; wb) as the unique pair of equilibrium e¤ort
levels for this game. We now introduce the following single-crossing property.
Theorem 1 Suppose that xa = xb =) @xa(wa;wb)@wa > (<)
@xb(wa;wb)
@wa
. Then
wa > wb =) xa(wa; wb) > (<)xb(wa; wb).
Proof of Theorem 1
We need to prove that if (i) xa = xb =) @xa(wa;wb)@wa >
@xb(wa;wb)
@wa
, then (ii)
wa > wb =) xa(wa; wb) > xb(wa; wb). Since xa(wb; wb) = xb(wb; wb) (i.e.,
the unique equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium), it follows from (i) that
@xa(wa;wb)
@wa
jwa=wb > @xb(wa;wb)@wa jwa=wb. If for some wa > wb, we have xa(wa; wb) 
7Our strategic contest models belong to the class of aggregative games for which
each individualspayo¤s only depend on their own e¤ort and on the aggregate e¤orts of
all players. It has been shown that aggregative games display special features that make
their analysis simpler under some conditions (Bergstrom and Varian 1985, Corchon 1994,
Acemoglu and Jensen 2013). Nevertheless, the following preliminary results are fairly
general, and not restricted to aggregative games.
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xb(wa; wb) this implies, due to the continuity of best responses, that there
exists wc 2 (wa; wb], such that xa(wc; wb) = xb(wc; wb) and @xa(wa;wb)@wa jwa=wc 
@xb(wa;wb)
@wa
jwa=wc, contradicting (i). Hence, we must have (ii) xa(wa; wb) >
xb(wa; wb). The case with reverse inequalities can be proved in an analogous
fashion. This proves Theorem 1.
This theorem implies that when @xa(wa;wb)
@wa
jwa=wb > @xb(wa;wb)@wa jwa=wb, player
a exerts more e¤ort than player b (when wa  wb). Thus, to compare within
an equilibrium the relative e¤ort of the rich and poor player, it is su¢ cient to
examine at the symmetric equilibrium how each player comparatively reacts
to an increase in the wealth of player a. This result is illustrated in Figure
A1.
Figure A1. Single crossing of the equilibrium e¤orts.
We have characterized a property of the equilibrium in an asymmetric
game. In addition, we will assume in the following that the condition 1  
f1g1 > 0 is always satised. Note that this is the case if we assume that the
equilibrium is locally stable, or jf1g1j < 1 (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green 1995, p. 414). We discuss this condition in A.3 below for our
three contest models.
Implicit di¤erentiation of (A.1)-(A.2) gives the e¤ects of isolated increases
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in wealth:
@xa
@wa
=
f2
1  f1g1 ; (A.3)
@xb
@wa
=
g1f2
1  f1g1 ; (A.4)
@xa
@wb
=
f1g2
1  f1g1 ; (A.5)
@xb
@wb
=
g2
1  f1g1 ; (A.6)
where the numerical subscripts with f and g denote partial derivatives and
these functions are all evaluated at equilibrium. Thus, an increase in wa
increases player as e¤ort i¤ f2 > 0 and increases players b e¤ort i¤ g1f2 > 0.
The corresponding e¤ects on aggregate e¤ort are
@xa
@wa
+
@xb
@wa
=
f2(1 + g1)
1  f1g1 , and
@xa
@wb
+
@xb
@wb
=
g2(1 + f1)
1  f1g1 : (A.7)
In a symmetric equilibrium (SE), fi = gi (i = 1; 2). In that case, the change
in individual e¤ort following a common wealth increase is
@xi
@wi
jSEdwa=dwb =
f2
1  f1 : (A.8)
Finally, when wealth is redistributed from b to a, dwa =  dwb. Then
dxa
dwa
jdwa= dwb =
f2   f1g2
1  f1g1 , and
dxb
dwa
jdwa= dwb =
g1f2   g2
1  f1g1 :
In a symmetric equilibrium, a wealth transfer from b to a has no rst-order
e¤ect on aggregate e¤ort since
dxa
dwa
jSEdwa= dwb =  
dxb
dwa
jSEdwa= dwb =
f2
1 + f1
:
The second-order e¤ect of such an MPS in wealth is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider a symmetric equilibrium. Let the stability condition
f 21 < 1 be satised. The second-order e¤ect of a MPS in wealth dwa =  dwb
on aggregate e¤ort xa + xb is given by
(f2)
2f11   2(1 + f1)f2f12 + (1 + f1)2f22
(1 + f1)(1  f 21 )
: (A.9)
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The numerator is a quadratic form in the Hessian of f().8 The denominator
is positive under the stability condition.
Proof of Theorem 2
For a symmetric equilibrium,
xa = f(f(xa; wb); wa) and xb = f(f(xb; wa); wb):
These expressions may be solved for the reduced form expressions for equi-
librium e¤ort:
xa = F (wa; wb) and xb = F (wb; wa):
Theorem 2 is now proven with the help of two lemmas.
Lemma 1 A small redistribution in wealth dwa =  dwb = t increases ag-
gregate e¤ort xa + xb i¤ F11   2F12 + F22 evaluated at (w;w) is positive.
Proof of Lemma 1
Starting from an equal wealth distribution (w;w); the new e¤ort level for
player a following a transfer t from b to a is then
xa(w+t; w t) = F (w+t; w t) ' F (w;w)+(F1 F2)t+1
2
(F11 2F12+F22)t2;
where Fi means the partial w.r.t. the ith argument and all derivatives are
evaluated at (w;w). Likewise, the new e¤ort level for player b is approxi-
mately
xb(w+t; w t) = F (w t; w+t) ' F (w;w) (F1 F2)t+1
2
(F11 2F12+F22)t2:
Hence, aggregate equilibrium e¤orts are equal to
xa(w + t; w   t) + xb(w + t; w   t) ' 2F (w;w) + (F11   2F12 + F22)t2:
Lemma 2 At a symmetric equilibrium,
F11   2F12 + F22 = (f2)
2f11   2(1 + f1)f2f12 + (1 + f1)2f22
(1 + f1)(1  f 21 )
;
where fi (fij) denotes the rst- (second-)order partial w.r.t. arguments i (ij).
8It can be written as ( f2; 1 + f1)
 
f11 f12
f12 f22
   f2
1+f1

. Moreover, it can be easily checked
that this form equals zero under the conditions identied in the theorem in Bergstrom and
Varian (1985, p. 717). These conditions ensure that the distribution of agent characteris-
tics has no e¤ect on aggregate e¤ort.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Let f(xb; wa) be the best-response function for agent a, and g(xa; wb) be
the best-response function for agent b. Then
xa = f(g(xa; wb); wa):
Implicit di¤erentiation then gives
dxa = f1g1dxa + f2dwa + f1g2dwb
F1 =
@xa
@wa
=
f2(g(xa; wb); wa)
1  f1(g(xa; wb); wa)g1(xa; wb)
F2 =
@xa
@wb
=
f1(g(xa; wb); wa)g2(xa; wb)
1  f1(g(xa; wb); wa)g1(xa; wb) :
Di¤erentiating one more time gives
F11 =
1
1  f1g1

f21g1
@xa
@wa
+ f22
+
f2
1  f1g1

f11g1
@xa
@wa
+ f12

g1 + f1g11
@xa
@wa

=
1
1  f1g1

f21g1
f2
1  f1g1 + f22
+
f2
1  f1g1

f11g1
f2
1  f1g1 + f12

g1 + f1g11
f2
1  f1g1

F12 =
1
1  f1g1

f21

g1
@xa
@wb
+ g2

+
f2
1  f1g1

f11

g1
@xa
@wb
+ g2

g1 + f1

g11
@xa
@wb
+ g12

=
1
1  f1g1

f21

g1
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g2

+
f2
1  f1g1

f11

g1
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g2

g1 + f1

g11
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g12

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F22 =
1
1  f1g1

f11

g1
@xa
@wb
+ g2

g2 + f1

g21
@xa
@wb
+ g22

+
f1g2
1  f1g1

f11

g1
@xa
@wb
+ g2

g1 + f1

g11
@xa
@wb
+ g12

=
1
1  f1g1

f11

g1
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g2

g2 + f1

g21
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g22

+
f1g2
1  f1g1

f11

g1
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g2

g1 + f1

g11
f1g2
1  f1g1 + g12

:
At a symmetric equilibrium, f12 = f21 = g21 = g12, f1 = g1, f2 = g2, and
f22 = g22. Then, using the above expressions, it can be shown that
F11   2F12 + F22 = (f2)
2f11   2(1 + f1)f2f12 + (1 + f1)2f22
(1 + f1)(1  f 21 )
:
The numerator is a quadratic form in the Hessian of the best-response func-
tion f(x2; w1):   f2 1 + f1   f11 f12f12 f22
   f2
1 + f1

:
The denominator will be positive under the stability assumption: jf1g1j =
jf 21 j = f 21 < 1 =) jf1j < 1.
The proof of Theorem 2 then follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
A.2 Power-logistic contest success functions
In this section, we display the properties of the power-logistic CSF which are
useful to derive our results below in each strategic contest model. Remember
that the CSF for player a is given by a(xa; xb) = p(xa; xb) =
xma
xma +x
m
b
;where
m > 0. Then b(xa; xb) = 1 p(xa; xb) = x
m
b
xma +x
m
b
. The derivatives of p(xa; xb)
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are (where SE= denotes evaluation at xa = xb = x)
p1 =
m
xa
ab
SE
=
1
4
m
x
> 0 and p2 =  m
xb
ab
SE
=  1
4
m
x
< 0;
p12 =
m2
xaxb
ab(a   b) > 0 i¤ xa > xb; and SE= 0;
p11 =
m
x2a
ab[ 1 +m(b   a)] SE=  1
4
m
x2
;
p22 =
m
x2b
ab[1 m(a   b)] SE= 1
4
m
x2
;
p111 = 2
m
x3a
ab   m
2
x3a
a
2
b +
m2
x3a
2ab  
m2
x3a
ab(b   a)
+
m2
x3a
ab[ 1 +m(a   b)](b   a)  2m
3
x3a
2a
2
b
SE
=
1
2
m
x3
  1
8
m3
x3
;
p122 =
m
xa
p22(b   a)  2 m
3
xax2b
2a
2
b
SE
=  1
8
m3
x3
;
p112 =
m
xa

p12   p2 1
xb

(b   a) + 2 m
3
x2axb
2a
2
b
SE
=
1
8
m3
x3
:
For future reference, we also note that
3p112   p111 SE= 1
2
m
x3
(m2   1):
A.3 Existence, uniqueness and stability
This section builds on the literature on strategic contests to identify condi-
tions ensuring the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium. Remember
that the payo¤ function in the privilege, ability, and rent-seeking contest
models can be written respectively:
Ui = u(wi   xi) + ir:
Ui = iu(wi + r) + (1  i)u(wi)  c(xi);
Ui = iu(wi + r   xi) + (1  i)u(wi   xi):
Observe rst that a su¢ cient condition for these payo¤ functions to be con-
cave in xi is that i is concave in xi, which under (2) implies m  1. This
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assumption is enough to ensure that best response functions are unique and
continuous in each contest model. We now derive a su¢ cient condition for
existence and uniqueness in each contest model.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique equilibrium:
i) in the privilege contest model, if  xu
00(w x)
u0(w x) > m  1;
ii) in the ability contest model, if xc
00(x)
c0(x) > m  1;
iii) in the rent-seeking contest model, if u() has non-increasing absolute
risk aversion and m  1.
Proof of Proposition 4
We follow the proof of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997). They show
that there always exists a unique equilibrium when the form of the payo¤
function for each player i can be written as follows:
Ui =
yiP
j yj
  gi(yi) with g0i > 0 and g
00
i > 0:
In the privilege contest model, we obtain this form of the payo¤ function
under the following change in variable gi(yi) =  u(wi   y
1
m
i )=r. Then it is
immediate that g0i > 0, and that g
00
i > 0 i¤
 xu00(w x)
u0(w x) > m  1. In the ability
contest model, we obtain the above form of the payo¤ function under the
following change in variable gi(yi) = c(y
1
m
i =(u(wi + r)   u(wi))). Then it
is immediate that g0i > 0, and that g
00
i > 0 i¤
xc00(x)
c0(x) > m   1. Therefore,
under u00 < 0 and c00 > 0, conditions i) and ii) hold as soon as m < 1. Fi-
nally, Yamazaki (2009) proves that there always exists a unique equilibrium
in the rent-seeking contest model with CSF (xa)
(xa)+(xb)
under non-increasing
absolute risk aversion and () concave, which for the power-logistic function
corresponds to m  1. This proves Proposition 4.
We now discuss the condition 1  f1g1 > 0. Throughout our analysis, we
assume that this condition is satised. We rst show that this is always the
case in the privilege and ability contest models, and then resort to a stability
condition which ensures that it is the case as well in the rent-seeking contest
model. In the privilege contest model, f1 and g1 have opposite signs; see
Appendix A.4. This implies f1g1 < 0 and the condition is satised. Similarly,
in the ability contest model, f1 and g1 also have opposite signs; see Appendix
A.5. Therefore f1g1 < 0 is also satised in that model. In the rent-seeking
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contest model, f1 and g1 need not have opposite signs, and the condition
1   f1g1 > 0 is thus not necessarily veried. We thus impose a stability
condition, i.e., jf1g1j < 1, which ensures that the condition 1   f1g1 > 0 is
indeed satised. See Nti (1997) for a discussion of a related stability condition
and of similar assumptions made in the literature on strategic contest models.
A.4 Privilege contest model
In this section, we demonstrate the results stated in Proposition 1 as well as
some results supporting various statements regarding the e¤ect of a MPS in
wealth at the end of Section 2.
Let Ui = u(wi xi)+ir: The marginal willingness to pay for the privilege
in terms of consumption, i
u0i
, is decreasing (along the indi¤erence curve) in
consumption.9 It also means that the marginal disutility of e¤ort is increas-
ing. Furthermore, we can express the dependency of this willingness to pay on
wealth in terms of the coe¢ cients of absolute risk aversion, Ai
def
=  u00(wi xi)
u0(wi xi) ,
and absolute prudence, Pi
def
=  u000(wi xi)
u00(wi xi) :
@( dwidr jdUi=0)
@wi
=
i
u0i
Ai, and
@2( dwidr jdUi=0)
@w2i
=
i
u0i
Ai(2Ai   Pi): (A.10)
Player as best-response f(xb; wa) is dened by the necessary rst- and
second-order conditions
 u0(wa   f(xb; wa)) + p1(f(xb; wa); xb)r = 0;
u00(wa   f(xb; wa)) + p11(f(xb; wa); xb)r < 0:
The latter condition can then also be written as
p11
p1
xa = m
1  (xa
xb
)m
1 + (xa
xb
)m
  1 < Aaxa: (A.11)
Simple comparative statics show that
f1 =   p12(xa; xb)r
u00(wa   xa) + p11(xa; xb)r and
f2 =
u00(wa   xa)
u00(wa   xa) + p11(xa; xb)r > 0,
9As   dwidr jdUi=0 = iu0i ,
@
@ri
(  dwidr jdUi=0)jdUi=0 = 
2
i
u0i
u00i
u0i
< 0:
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where the inequality follows from the concavity of u and the second-order
condition. Therefore player as best-response increases when that players
wealth increases. Likewise, player bs best-response g(xa; wb) satises the
necessary rst- and second-order conditions
 u0(wb   g(xa; wb))  p2(xa; g(xa; wb))r = 0;
u00(wb   g(xa; wb))  p22(xa; g(xa; wb))r < 0;
where the last condition is equivalent to
p22
p2
xb = m
1  ( xb
xa
)m
1 + ( xb
xa
)m
  1 < Abxb: (A.12)
Di¤erentiating with respect to xa and wb, we obtain
g1 =
 p12(xa; xb)r
 u00(wb   xb) + p22(xa; xb)r ;
g2 =
 u00(wb   xb)
 u00(wb   xb) + p22(xa; xb)r > 0:
At a symmetric equilibrium, p12 = 0 (cf. (3)) and therefore f1 = g1 = 0.
Hence, at a symmetric equilibrium
@xa
@wa
= f2 > 0 and
@xb
@wa
= 0;
and relying on Theorem 1 we can conclude that xa > xb i¤wa > wb. In view
of (3), we can also conclude that p12 > 0. As a result, an isolated increase
in the wealth of the poor player, b, increases both the equilibrium e¤ort of
that player (cf. (A.6) and g2 > 0) as well as that of the rich player (cf. (A.5)
and f1; g2 > 0). Hence, total equilibrium e¤orts also increase. Alternatively,
an increase in the wealth of the rich player, a, increases that players own
equilibrium e¤ort (cf. (A.3) and f2 > 0) but reduces that of the poor player,
b (cf. (A.4) and g1 < 0 < f2). We know from (A.7) that this total e¤ect
depends on (1 + g1). Observe now that 1 + g1 > 0 i¤
[p12(xa; xb)  p22(xa; xb)] r <  u00(wb   xb),
which, using the rst-order condition for player b, may be written as
(xa; xb)
def
=
p12(xa; xb)  p22(xa; xb)
 p2(xa; xb) xb < Abxb: (A.13)
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For the power-logistic CSF, (xa; xb) = m
1 ( xb
xa
)m
1+(
xb
xa
)m
(1 + xb
xa
)   1.10 Condi-
tion (A.13) compares two curvature measures. The lhs, (xa; xb), equals
d log
@b
@xb
d log xb
jd(xa+xb)=0, or the elasticity of bs marginal return to e¤ort given that
total e¤ort remains constant. The rhs of (A.13) corresponds to
d log(  @u(wb xb)
@xb
)
d log xb
,
the elasticity of the marginal utility cost of e¤ort. If the latter exceeds the
former, bs reaction is temperate enough for aggregate e¤ort to correlate with
that of a.
What happens under uniformwealth growth? With unequal initial wealth,
total e¤ort will change with
(1  f1g1)(dxa + dxb) = [(1 + g1) f2wa + (1 + f1) g2wb] d logw; (A.14)
where dlogw denotes the common growth rate in wealth. Thus, the same
su¢ cient condition for total e¤ort to increase when b gets richer, ensures that
total e¤ort is a normal good. In a symmetric game, wa = wb and therefore
xa = xb, so that (A.14) reduces to
(dxa + dxb) = 2f2wd logw > 0: (A.15)
We nally discuss the e¤ects of wealth inequality. We can then invoke
Theorem 2, and show the following result in A.7.
Theorem 3 Let A =  u00()=u0() and P =  u000()=u00(). In the symmetric
privilege contest model, the sign of the quadratic form (A.9) is positive i¤
2A(1 m2) > P: (A.16)
First, note that this inequality may also be written as 2A   P > 2Am2.
Thus, if the marginal willingness to pay for rent is concave in nal wealth (cf.
(A.10)), a small MPS in wealth reduces total e¤ort. When u is quadratic,
P = 0, and the inequality reduces to m < 1. When u is CARA, A = P and
the inequality reduces to m < 2 
1
2 ' :707. Thus the quadratic and CARA
cases illustrate instances where the value of the decisiveness parameter of
10Comparing (A.13) with (A.12) shows that when the SOC for b barely holds (i.e., close
to zero), a su¢ ciently large p12 will result into 1+g1 < 0: the increase in as e¤ort triggers
such a strong negative reduction in bs e¤ort that aggregate e¤ort falls. A su¢ ciently large
p12 can be provoked by both a high decisiviness parameter m and a su¢ cient degree of
wealth inequality (small xbxa , or large a  b).
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the CSF determines whether the e¤ect of a MPS in wealth on total e¤ort is
positive or negative. If we multiply (A.16) by (w x), we may replace A and
P by  u00(w x)
u0(w x) (w   x) and  u
000(w x)
u00(w x) (w   x), the coe¢ cients of relative risk
aversion and relative prudence, respectively. When u() has constant relative-
risk aversion (CRRA) denoted by , the inequality reduces to (1
2
 m2) > 1
2
.
A.5 Ability contest model
In this section, we demonstrate the results stated in Proposition 2 as well as
some results supporting various statements regarding the e¤ect of a MPS in
wealth at the end of Section 3.
Let Ui = iu(wi + r) + (1   i)u(wi)   c(xi); with c0 > 0 and c00  0.
The best-response of player a, f(xb; wa), is dened by the necessary rst- and
second-order conditions
p1(f(xb; wa); xb)ua   c0(f(xb; wa)) = 0;
p11(f(xb; wa); xb)ua   c00(f(xb; wa)) < 0;
where ui
def
= u(wi+ r) u(wi) > 0 (i = a; b), and similar denitions for u0i
and u00i . Eliminating ua from the second-order condition, this may also
be written as
p11
p1
xa <
c00(xa)
c0(xa)
xa: (A.17)
Simple comparative statics show that
f1 =   p12ua
p11ua   c00(xa) and f2 =  
p1u
0
a
p11ua   c00(xa) < 0,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of u() and the second-order
condition. Similarly, player bs best-response g(xa; wb) satises the necessary
rst- and second-order conditions
 p2(xa; g(xa; wb))ub   c0(g(xa; wb)) = 0;
 p22(xa; g(xa; wb))ub   c00(g(xa; wb)) < 0;
and di¤erentiating with respect to xa and wb yields
g1 =
 p21ub
p22ub + c00(xb)
, and g2 =
 p2u0b
p22ub + c00(xb)
< 0:
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Again, at a symmetric equilibrium, p12 = 0 and therefore f1 = g1 = 0. Hence,
at a symmetric equilibrium (cf. (A.3) and (A.4))
@xa
@wa
= f2 < 0 =
@xb
@wa
;
and Theorem 1 allows us to conclude that xa < xb i¤ wa > wb.
An increase in player as wealth reduces that players equilibrium e¤ort
(cf. (A.3) and f2 < 0). And because p12 < 0, the equilibrium e¤ort of the
poorer player, b, will also fall (cf. (A.4) and f2 < 0 < g1): that is, the poor
players e¤ort is a strategic complement to that of the rich player. Total
equilibrium e¤ort then unambiguously declines (f2(1+g1)
1 f1g1 < 0).
Conversely, an isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player, b, reduces
that players own equilibrium e¤ort, (cf (A.6) and g2 < 0), but increases the
equilibrium e¤ort of the rich player (cf. (A.5) and f1; g2 < 0). Without
further restrictions, the sign of the e¤ect on total equilibrium e¤ort, g2(1+f1)
1 f1g1 ,
is then ambiguous. Using the rst-order condition for a, we show that a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for 1+ f1 to be positive, i.e., for aggregate
e¤ort to fall, is
p11   p12
p1
xa <
c00(xa)
c0(xa)
xa: (A.18)
Notice that p11 p12
p1
xa = (xb; xa) < 0 (where () was dened in (A.13))
and we therefore obtain a similar su¢ cient condition as for the privilege
contest model.11 The lhs of (A.18) can be interpreted as d log p1d log xa jd(xa+xb)=0,
the elasticity of as marginal return to e¤ort given that total e¤ort remains
constant. The rhs corresponds to the elasticity of as marginal cost of e¤ort.
If the latter elasticity exceeds the former, player as reaction is temperate
enough for aggregate e¤ort to correlate with that of b. Observe that for
m < 1,  < 0, (A.18) is always satised and aggregate e¤ort falls when agent
b alone gets wealthier.
With initially unequal wealth, general wealth growth a¤ects total e¤ort
by (A.14), with both terms on the rhs negative if (A.18) holds; total e¤ort
is an inferior good. In a symmetric contest, the e¤ect is given by (A.15)
and therefore negative (as f2 < 0). If (A.18) holds, a common increase in
11If the second-order condition for a barely holds, a reduction in xb triggers a huge
increase in xa, resulting in a larger total e¤ort. Both a large m or a high degree of wealth
inequality (xaxb  1, i.e. b  a  0) will contribute to this.
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wealth decreases total e¤ort in the ability contest model. With equal wealth,
a common increase in wealth always decreases the e¤orts of both players.
We now examine the e¤ect of a small MPS in wealth. Using Theorem 2,
we can show the following result in A.7.
Theorem 4 Consider the symmetric ability contest model with a convex
power cost of e¤ort, i.e., c(x) = x (  1). The sign of the quadratic
form (A.9) is positive i¤
u00=u0
u0=u
2   (   1)

  2m2 > 0: (A.19)
With CARA preferences, A =  u00
u0 =  u
0
u
, and the large round bracket
term simplies to  so that we have m <
p

2
. With quadratic preferences,
u00
u0 = 0, and the large round bracket term becomes  (   1)  0. Under
CRRA, it can be shown that the term u
00=u0
u0=u has the Taylor expansion
1 + 

(1 +
1
12
 r
w
2
) +O(
 r
w
3
):
and we have m <
q
1
24
+1

 
12 + ( r
w
)2

2   1
2
(   1).
A.6 Rent-seeking contest model
In this section, we demonstrate the results stated in Proposition 3 as well as
some results supporting various statements regarding the e¤ect of a MPS in
wealth at the end of Section 4.
Let Ui = iu(wi + r   xi) + (1  i)u(wi   xi). Using similar notations
as above, as best-response f(xb; wa), is now dened by
p1(f(xb; wa); xb)ua   Eu0a = 0;
p11(f(xb; wa); xb)ua   2p1(f(xb; wa); xb)u0a + Eu00a < 0;
where Eu0i and Eu
00
i denote expected marginal utility and its second-order
equivalent (i = a; b). Simple computations show that
f1 =   p12ua   p2u
0
a
p11ua   2p1u0a + Eu00a
, and (A.20)
f2 =   p1u
0
a   Eu00a
p11ua   2p1u0a + Eu00a
.
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Unlike the privilege and ability contest models, an increase in wealth has
an ambiguous e¤ect on the best-response function. The reason is that addi-
tional wealth reduces both the marginal benet of winning the rent and the
(expected) marginal cost of e¤ort.
Similarly, player bs best-response g(xa; wb) satises the necessary rst-
and second-order conditions
 p2(xa; g(xa; wb))ub   Eu0b = 0;
 p22(xa; g(xa; wb))ub + 2p2(xa; g(xa; wb))u0b + Eu00b < 0:
Di¤erentiating with respect to xa and wb, we obtain
g1 =    p21ub + p1u
0
b
 p22ub + 2p2u0b + Eu00b
, and
g2 =    p2u
0
b   Eu00b
 p22ub + 2p2u0b + Eu00b
.
At a symmetric equilibrium, p12 = 0, and therefore, f1; g1 < 0. Hence, at a
symmetric equilibrium
@xa
@wa
=
f2
1  f1g1 and
@xb
@wa
=
g1f2
1  f1g1 ;
and we may claim that @xa
@wa
jSE ? 0 ? @xb
@wa
jSE i¤ f2 ? 0.
Note that the sign of f2 is given by the sign of its numerator, which upon
using the rst-order condition for a can be written as
Eu0a

u0a
ua
  Eu
00
a
Eu0a

: (A.21)
Let us now dene two lotteries: a uniformly distributed lottery ez =dU(wa  
xa; wa xa+ r) and a binary lottery ey =d (wa xa+ r; 12 ;wa xa; 12), so that
the term in round brackets can be written as12
 Eu00a(ey)
Eu0a(ey)    Eu
00
a(ez)
Eu0a(ez) :
Given that the binary lottery (ey) is a MPS of the uniform lottery (ez), the sign
of f2 is positive (resp. negative) if the MPS of a background risk increases
(resp. decreases) the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion.
12EUu
0(ez) = R wa xa+r
wa xa u
0
a(ez) 1rdez = 1rua and EUu00(ez) = R wa xa+rwa xa u00a(ez) 1rdez = 1ru0a.
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Following Denition 1, if u 2 
, then @xa
@wa
> 0 > @xb
@wa
at a symmetric
equilibrium as g1 < 0. Hence, Theorem 1 allows us to conclude that for
u 2 
, in an asymmetric rent-seeking game wa > wb implies xa > xb, and
therefore p12 > 0. As a result, u 2 
 ensures that an isolated increase in
as wealth will raise that players equilibrium e¤ort level. The equilibrium
reaction of the poorer agent, b, is negative. As before, aggregate e¤ort will
increase i¤ 1 + g1 > 0. For the rent-seeking contest model, this condition is
equivalent to
p21   p22
 p2 +
2p2   p1
 p2
u0b
ub
+
Eu00b
Eu0b
< 0
m p1
p2
=
xb
xa
(xa; xb) +

1 +
xb
xa

 u
0
b
ub

xb <

 Eu
00
b
Eu0b

 

 u
0
b
ub

xb: (A.22)
We know that the rhs is positive if u 2 
. But as the second lhs term is
positive, (xa; xb) < 0 is no longer su¢ cient for 1 + g1 > 0.
If the poor person becomes wealthier, that players e¤ort changes with
g2
1 f1g1 , which is positive if u 2 
 (the reasoning is the same as for f2). The
rich agents equilibrium e¤ort changes with f1g2
1 f1g1 . From (A.20), it transpires
that f1 > 0 i¤
p12
 p2 >  
u0a
ua
. Since the sign of p12 depends on that of xa  xb,
a necessary condition for a to increase e¤ort is that a is su¢ ciently richer
than b. As bs wealth approaches that of a, the latter will begin to reduce
e¤ort despite the fact that b is increasing e¤ort. The two e¤ort levels then
turn into strategic substitutes. Thus, in the rent-seeking contest model, the
nature of the strategic interaction depends on wealth levels. This possibility
of strategic substitutability also blurs the e¤ect of wb on aggregate e¤ort.
Indeed, a similar argument as above shows that 1 + f1 > 0 i¤
p11   p12
p1
  2p1   p2
p1
u0a
ua
+
Eu00a
Eu0a
< 0
m
(xb; xa) +

1 +
xa
xb

 u
0
a
ua

xa <

 Eu
00
a
Eu0a

 

 u
0
a
ua

xa: (A.23)
Given xa
xb
> 1, the rst lhs term is negative (since p12 > 0 > p11). The
rhs is positive if u 2 
. Once again, the positive second lhs term blurs the
inequality.
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The CARA utility function satises the conditions for 
 just (since
background risk has no e¤ect on absolute risk aversion under CARA). Hence,
it provides a boundary case where f2 = 0 and g2 = 0, which is easily checked
as both  u
0
i
ui
and  Eu
00
i
Eu0i
equal the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. The
quadratic utility function provides another case where f2 = 0 and g2 = 0. In
both cases, aggregate e¤ort is una¤ected by an isolated increase in wealth.
With a common increase in wealth, aggregate e¤orts change with 2 f2
1 f1 .
Hence, u 2 
 ensures that uniform growth in wealth will increase the repre-
sentative agents e¤ort.
We nally discuss the e¤ect of wealth inequality on aggregate e¤ort in
the rent-seeking contest model. For the reason discussed earlier, there is no
e¤ect of wealth distribution across players under CARA or quadratic utility.
The following theorem is proven in A.7.
Theorem 5 In the symmetric rent-seeking contest model, the sign of the
quadratic form (A.9) is positive i¤
p211p1T1 + 4p11p
2
1T2 + (3p112   p111) p21T3 + 4p31T4 < 0 (A.24)
where
T1 =
Eu00
Eu0

Eu000
Eu00
  2u
0
u

  u
0
u

u00
u0
  2u
0
u

;
T2 =
u0
u

u0
u

Eu00
Eu0
  u
0
u

  Eu
00
Eu0

Eu000
Eu00
  u
00
u0

;
T3 =

Eu00
Eu0
  u
0
u
2
;
T4 =

u0
u
2 
u00
u0

u0
u
  Eu
00
Eu0

+
Eu00
Eu0

Eu000
Eu00
  u
00
u0

:
With CARA preferences, all ratios in T1; T2; T3, and T4 coincide with
 A, and therefore the four terms equal zero. The same is true for quadratic
preferences, u(y) = y  
2
y2.13 In A.7 below, we can then prove the following
theorem.
13In that case, u = y(1   Ey), u0 =  y, u00 = 0, Eu0 = 1   Ey, Eu00 =
 ;Eu000 = 0, where y = r and Ey = w   x + 12r. Then u
0
u =
Eu00
Eu0 =   1 Ey and
u00
u0 =
Eu000
Eu00 = 0. Once again, all four terms vanish.
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Theorem 6 With CRRA preferences and small r
w
, the inequality (A.24) is
violated.
None of the preferences considered in the results above (i.e., quadratic,
CARA, and CRRA) result in larger aggregate e¤orts. At the same time,
these three types of preferences share a non-negative third derivative of u()
(prudence). This suggests that a negative third derivative (imprudence)
may be a necessary condition for a MPS in wealth to raise aggregate e¤ort.
This conjecture is supported by the following example.
Example 1 Suppose that u(y) = y   
2
y2 + 
3
y3 with  = 1
15
and   2
1000
,
such that u00(y) < 0 for all y < 15. Then for a symmetric rent-seeking contest
model with w = 10; r = 1;m = 1:5, and for  2 [ :002; 0], a small MPS in
wealth results in higher aggregate e¤orts, as shown in Table A1.
Table A1. Results for cubic preferences.a
 x SOC Eu(x)  Eu(0) qf
-.0020 .3760 -.2114 .0023 .0052
-.0015 .3755 -.3583 .0099 .0006
-.0010 .3753 -.5055 .0176 .0001
-.0005 .3751 -.6527 .0252 .00002
0 .375 -.8 .0328 0
.0005 .3749 -.9473 .0404 -.000004
.0010 .3749 -1.0947 .0480 -.000003
.0015 .3748 -1.2420 .0557 -.000001
aThe columns respectively provide the values of the prudence coe¢ cient , the equi-
librium e¤ort (x), the value of the second-order condition (SOC), the gain in expected
utility when playing x rather than 0 against x, and the value of the lhs of (A.24) (qf ).
A.7 Proofs of Theorems 3, 4, 5 and 6
For all three contest models, we can say that the rst- and second-order
conditions for agent a are given by
h(xa; wa; xb) = 0;
h1(xa; wa; xb) < 0:
Hence, the optimal responses to dwa and dxb are given by
@xa
@wa
=  h2
h1
and
@xa
@xb
=  h3
h1
.
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The second-order responses are then given by
@2xa
@w2a
=
@( h2
h1
)
@wa
+
@( h2
h1
)
@xa
@xa
@wa
=

  1
h1
"
h22   2h2
h1
h12 +

h2
h1
2
h11
#
(A.25)
@2xa
@wa@xb
=
@( h2
h1
)
@xb
+
@( h2
h1
)
@xa
@xa
@xb
=

  1
h1

h23   h2
h1
h13   h3
h1
h21 +
h2
h1
h3
h1
h11

(A.26)
@2xa
@x2b
=
@( h2
h1
)
@xb
+
@( h2
h1
)
@xa
@xa
@xb
=

  1
h1
"
h33   2h3
h1
h13 +

h3
h1
2
h11
#
: (A.27)
Proof of Theorem 3
For the privilege contest model, we have the following h-functions:
h =  u0(wa   xa) + p1r = 0
h1 = u
00(wa   xa) + p11r < 0
h2 =  u00a; h3 = p12r SE= 0;
h11 =  p111r   u000a ; h12 = u000a ; h13 = p112r;
h22 =  u000a ; h23 = 0; h33 = p122r:
With the help of (A.25)-(A.27), the partials of f(xb; wa) can then be com-
puted
f11 =

  r
h31
  u000a p211r + (u00a)2p111 ;
f22 =

  r
h31

p122h
2
1;
f12 =

  r
h31

u00ap112 (u
00
a + p11r) :
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Given h3 = 0, we obtain that f1 = 0 and 1 + f1 = 1. Applying Theorem 2
then obtains that the sign of the quadratic form (A.9) is given by the sign of
A (p111   3p112)  P p
2
11
p1
;
where A def=  u00(w x)
u0(w x) and P
def
=  u000(w x)
u00(w x) . Making use of the expressions for
the p-derivatives gives
A
1
2
m
x3
 
1 m2  P 1
4
m
x3
:
This proves Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 4
For the ability contest model, we obtain the following expressions for the
h function
h =
@p
@xa
ua [u(wa + r)  u(wa)]  c0a = 0
h1 =
@2p
@x2a
ua   c00a < 0
h2 =
@p
@xa
u0a; h3 =
@2p
@xa@xb
ua
SE
= 0
h11 =
@3p
@x3a
ua   c000a ; h12 =
@2p
@x2a
u0a
h13 =
@3p
@x2a@xb
ua; h22 =
@p
@xa
u00a
h23 =
@2p
@xa@xb
u0a
SE
= 0; h33 =
@3p
@xa@x2b
ua;
where ua
def
= [u(wa + r)  u(wa)]. Making use of (A.25)-(A.27), we obtain
the following curvatures for the best-response function:
f22 =

  1
h31
 
p1u
00
ah
2
1   2p1p11(u0a)2h1 + p21(u0a)2(p111ua   c000

;
f11 =

  1
h31

p122uah
2
1;
f12 =

  1
h31

( p112p1u0auah1) :
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Given h3 = 0, f1 = 0 and 1 + f1 = 1, application of Theorem 1 gives that
the quadratic form (A.9) is given by
  1
h31
 3(u0)2up21p112 + [u00u  2(u0)2]up1(p11)2
+(u0)2up21p111   2[u00u  (u0)2]p1p11c00 +u00p1c002
 (u0)2p21c000
	
:
Since h1 < 0 (SOC), the sign of the quadratic form is the sign of the term
in curly brackets. Making use of the derivatives of the power-logistic CSF in
the symmetric equilibrium, the power specication for c(x), c(x) = x, and
the FOC evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, m
4x
u = c0, this term can
be written as (up to a positive constant)
 2m2 + u
00=u0
u0=u

+ (   1)

u00=u0
u0=u
(1 + )  

:
Then the quadratic form is therefore positive i¤
u00=u0
u0=u
2   (   1) > 2m2:
This proves Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 5
For the rent-seeking contest model, the h-functions are given by
h = p1ua   Eu0a = 0;
h1 = p11ua   2p1u0a + Eu00a < 0
h2 = p1u
0
a   Eu00a; h3 = p12ua   p2u0a SE= p1u0a
h11 = p111ua   3p11u0a + 3p1u00a   Eu000a
h12 = p11u
0
a   2p1u00a + Eu000a
h13 = p112ua   2p12u0a + p2u00a SE= p112ua   p1u00a
h22 = p1u
00
a   Eu000a ; h23 = p12u0a   p2u00a
h33 = p122ua   p22u0a SE=  p112ua + p11u0a;
where ua
def
= u(wa+ r xa) u(wa xa). With the help of these derivatives
and expressions (A.25)-(A.27), the curvatures f11; f12; and f22 for as best-
response function are computed. Using Theorem 2, and simple, but tedious,
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factorization, it can be shown14 that the sign of the quadratic form F11  
2F12 + F22 can be written as
1
G

p211p1T1 + 4p11p
2
1T2 + (3p112   p111) p21T3 + 4p31T4

; (A.28)
where
T1 =
Eu00
Eu0

Eu000
Eu00
  2u
0
u

  u
0
u

u00
u0
  2u
0
u

;
T2 =
u0
u

u0
u

Eu00
Eu0
  u
0
u

  Eu
00
Eu0

Eu000
Eu00
  u
00
u0

;
T3 =

Eu00
Eu0
  u
0
u
2
;
T4 =

u0
u
2 
u00
u0

u0
u
  Eu
00
Eu0

+
Eu00
Eu0

Eu000
Eu00
  u
00
u0

; and
G =

p11   p1u
0
u
+ p1
Eu00
Eu0

p11   3p1u
0
u
+ p1
Eu00
Eu0
2
:
Note that G is negative given the term in the rst round brackets can be
written as h1
u
+ @pa
@xa
u0
u
and both h1 and u0 are negative because of the
second-order condition and risk aversion, respectively. This proves Theorem
5.
Proof of Theorem 6
The rst-order condition for x is given by h(xa; wa; xb) = 0, where
h(xa; wa; xb) =
@pa(xa; xb)
@xa
[u(wa + r   xa)  u(wa + r   xa)]
 [p(xa; xb)u(wa + r   xa) + (1  p(xa; xb))u(wa   xa)]:
At a symmetric equilibrium (x = xa = xb),
@pa(x;x)
@xa
= 1
4
m
x
and pa(x; x) = 12 .
Using for u(y) the CRRA form, u(y) = y
1 
1  , and taking a Taylor expansion
of degree 2 around r = 0, results in
h(x;w; x) ' (w x) 

 1 +

1
4
m
x
+
1
2

w   x

r  

1
8
m
x

w   x +
1
4
(1 + )
(w   x)2

r2

:
14The Maple les are available from the authors upon request.
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Equating the rhs to zero and solving for x gives three roots, with the real
solution being 1
4
mr+O(r3) (in fact 1
4
mr is the solution to the case of quadratic
preferences). Replacing x by 1
4
mr, the obtained expressions for T1; T2; T3, and
T4 are then Taylor-approximated around r = 0:
T1 =
1
2
(1 + )
w4
r2 +O(r3);
T2 =
1
3
2(1 + )
w5
r2 +O(r3);
T3 = O(r
3); and
T4 =
2
3
3(1 + )
w6
r2 +O(r3):
Next, the coe¢ cients with T1; T2, and T4 are computed using the earlier
derived expressions for the probability function and its derivatives, and eval-
uating them at x = 1
4
mr. Finally, the numerator of (A.28) is computed. Up
to a negative proportionality factor, it is equivalent to
1  2
3

m
r
w

+
1
2

m
r
w
2
:
The expression has no real roots and is always positive. Hence, for CRRA
preferences and a rent that is small w.r.t. the initial wealth w, a small MPS
in wealth reduces aggregate e¤ort. This proves Theorem 6.
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